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Abstract 
In the territory of concurrent systems such as wireless sensor networks (WSN), the 
computational nodes being used in wireless sensor networks faces challenges with security 
applications. Many different security protocols have been proposed that allow some form of 
security enhancement but not implemented. This article investigates and implements a number of 
smart security techniques appropriate for WSN nodes with various trade-off such as power 
consumption and scalability. We provide a brief survey of the major approaches to security 
prerogative and methods that could reduce if not eliminate algorithmic complexity and denial of 
service attacks to sensor nodes. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Concurrent systems such as Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are becoming very useful in various 
day-to-day communication systems [1]. However, with the surge in the usage; WSN are still hampered 
by limited communication range, low memory capacity and limited energy. These constraints create a 
very big challenge for current security relevance. 
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This article investigates new security implementation for WSN, including various trade-off such as 
implementation complexity, power dissipation [2], security flexibility and scalability. This smart 
security implementation is designed to have efficient and flexible key distribution system secured 
enough to prevent denial-of-service attacks while conserving energy [3]. A reassessment of Blom’s 
key generation was implemented [4]. Our goal was to provide a secured pre-distribution and 
distribution of keys by every single node in WSN with a piece of Advanced encrypted (AES) secured 
data that would be generating a pairwise key with every other node in the network, thereby the 
resultant pairwise key will now transmit to every other node in the network. This system was 
implemented in Contiki operating system in place of TinyOS because of the advantage of 
multithreading. We can summarise the contribution of this research as follows: An intelligent key 
allocation and Key Pre-distribution that secures the Base station and the sensor nodes before 
deployment. An intelligent routine mechanism that set-up the stage for encryption in the network, with 
trade-off in power consumption: a unique combination of advanced encryption standard (AES) with 
key management technique and alternative security mechanism with uIP-WSN configuration. 
 
2 A Survey of Security Techniques – Literature Review 
Security encompasses the characteristics of authentication, integrity, privacy, non-repudiation, and 
anti-play back [6]. The greater the dependency of information sent or received in the network, the 
greater the security risk. Various security issues that have received consideration in ad hoc networks 
[7, 8] are not applicable to WSN due to architectural disparity between these two types of networks 
[5]. Also, quite a number of other security schemes are already being proposed. If the cluster 
formation design by [9] currently being investigated is found to be effective in saving energy, there is 
need to look at the security between the individual nodes, neighbouring nodes and the base station.  
2.1 Denial-of-Service (DoS) Threats to WSN 
Many WSN deployments are security sensitive and attacks against them may lead to damage to health 
and safety of people. Denial of service creates conditions for hardware failures, resource exhaustion, 
bugs, malicious attacks and environmental conditions that could reduce the functionality or totally 
eliminating a networks ability to perform as expected [10]. In this section, we have specified in a 
tabular format (Table 1) and later described the DoS vulnerabilities to the networks as studied by many 
proposed authors in the physical layer, media access control (MAC) layer, network layer, transport 
layer and application layer. 
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Table 1. Different Protocol layers: Attacks and Defences [11] 
Protocol Layer Attacks Defences 
Physical Jamming [11, and 12] Detect and sleep 
Route around jammed regions 
Node destruction [13] Hide or camouflage nodes. 
Tamper-proof packaging 
MAC Layer Denial of sleep [10, 11, and 
14] 
Authentication and anti-replay 
protection. 
Detect and sleep method 
Broadcast attack protection 
Interrogation [10, 11, and 13] Authentication and anti-replay 
protection 
Network Spoofing, replaying or 
altering clustering messages 
[10, and 13] 
Authentication and replay protection. 
Secure cluster formation 
 
Hello Floods [10, 13, and 16] Pairwise authentication 
Geographical routing 
Homing [13] Header encryption 
Dummy packets 
Sybil [10, and 17] Radio resource testing, key validation, 
position authentication 
Wormhole [15] Location based routing protocols 
Transport Synchronise flood [10, and 
11] 
Synchronised cookies 
 
Desynchronised attack [11, 
and 13] 
Packet authentication 
Application Overwhelming Sensors [11] Sensor tuning 
Data aggregation 
Path-based DoS [18] Authentication and anti-replay 
protection 
Re-programming attack [11, 
19 and 20] 
Authentication and anti-replay 
protection. 
Authentication streams 
 
3 Enhanced Security Technique for Wireless Sensor Networks 
This section explains the proposed smart security technique for Wireless Sensor Network nodes. The 
generation of the network parameters using, Blom’s proposed scheme for pre-distribution that tends to 
allow any of the sensors in WSN to find one common pairwise key as long as a network contains more 
than λ- sensors, the network is then considered to be perfectly secured. Our scheme also solves the 
issues arising from the distribution of keys with a more smart method for securing the data in the 
network called the Enhanced Security technique. This method involves the integration of advanced 
encryption standard (AES) to the key management that allows the network to have extra security in the 
transmission and reception of data. This chapter also analyses the matrices compromised in pairwise 
key generation as well as detailed description of each matrices. Each of the units is designed for both 
performance and confidentiality view point to allow the network to achieve scalability.  
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3.1 Key Generation Technique 
The Blom’s pairwise key pre-distribution idea was proposed to be used in WSS base station to 
construct ( 1) Nλ + × matrix G over finite field ( )GF q . Although, Blom’s scheme does not propose how 
G matrix should be generated, the only requirement is that its columns must be linearly independent in 
order to achieve the λ-secure property. In our implementation, we decided to use the Vandermonde 
[21, 22, and 23] matrix since it is easy to implement and meets the requirement. A random symmetric 
(λ+1) x (λ+1) matrix D over finite field ( )GF q should also be constructed. The matrix D is considered 
to be private information and none of the nodes in the WSS is supposed to know the D matrix while G 
can be known. In order to calculate the final K matrix from which we can extract the pairwise keys, the 
base station should first multiply the D and G matrix, then transpose and multiply the result with the G 
matrix. This section therefore explains how the various parameters are generated. 
 
3.1.1 Generation of G matrix 
Matrix G is a ( 1) Nλ + ×  matrix over a finite field ( )GF q  where N is number of nodes in the network, 
generated by the base station in the pre-allocation phase. Blom’s pairwise Key-Distribution Scheme 
does not propose how G matrix should be generated; the only requirement is that its columns must be 
linearly independent in order to achieve the λ-secure property. In the matrix generation 
implementation; Vandermonde matrix was used because it is not complex like the other methods and 
meets the requirement. 
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Let q be the smallest prime number that is larger than length of the pairwise key, s be the primitive 
element of a finite field ( )GF q  and N q≺ . Then, if 2( , ,s s    2 ,....,s )zs  2 2( , ,........ ,...., )Ns s s s are 
distinct, the columns of ( )GF q are linearly independent. In the implementation there is no need to 
generate the entire G matrix all at once. In fact, as more nodes connect, the G matrix has to be 
extended. Therefore, the base station keeps track only of the matrix seed ns  where n  is the number of 
currently connected nodes and generates column CG  for the node as follows: 
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3.1.2 Generation of D matrix 
Along with G matrix the base station also generates random symmetric ( 1) ( 1)Dλ λ+ × +  matrix over a 
finite field ( )GF q but unlike G matrix, the D matrix is kept secret and must not be disclosed to any 
sensor node or adversary in the wireless sensor network at any time. 
 
 
                                              (3) 
                                                           
The D matrix must be generated all at once and it has to be stored in the base station the entire lifespan 
of the network. 
 
3.1.3 Generation of A matrix 
A  is ( 1)N λ× +  matrix that is the result of computation ( )TA DG=  where ( )TDG  is transpose of 
(DG). Each row of a matrix is disclosed the one sensor in the wireless sensor network in order to allow 
the node to generate its pairwise key with other sensors. 
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In practice, since the base station does not preserve the entire G matrix, a row of A matrix 
r
A  is 
generated from the column of G matrix cG  at a time when a sensor is connecting to the network as 
follows: 
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 is then disclosed to the node where it is used for computation of pairwise keys. 
 
3.1.4 Generation of K matrix 
K matrix is the result of computation K = AG. 
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Since D is a symmetric matrix we can see that: 
( ) ( )T T T T TK AG DG G G D G G DG AG= = = = =              (7) 
K is therefore a symmetric matrix. This means that  where  is an element of K on i-th 
row and j-th column. 
,j iK is used as a pairwise key between nodes i  and j . 
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In practice when node i  wants to communicate with node j , it sends the seed is . Node j  is then able 
to generate the column cG  of matrix G and using the row rA  of matrix A it received from the base 
station compute pairwise key
,i jK  as follows: 
( 1)
, , ,
1
( )i j k c r k
k
K G A
λ +
=
= ∗∑             (9) 
Because matrix A is symmetric, when node i  receives from the node  seed js  and is able to generate 
the exact same pairwise key as node . 
 
3.2 Key Allocation and Pre-Distribution of Sensor Nodes 
One of the biggest issues in WSN is the ability of the sensor nodes to have a secure communication. In 
order to achieve a complete security in the whole network, it is essential to look at few assumptions 
that were taking into consideration: a) The security in the base station is reliable. b) The base station 
has unlimited power supply and high computational ability to support the network. c) That existing 
node and incoming node must maintain a unique master key. d) That every node has the ability to send 
data to the base station once it is in the communication range. e) That every node has the ability to 
function as a cluster head. 
The type of key agreement that is currently been used is the pre-distribution scheme, where key 
information is allocated to all sensor nodes before deployment. This method becomes the approved 
method to solving the key agreement issues as explained by [3]. This is the first step of the proposal 
for security concern and schemes in maintaining energy efficient data gathering. Blom’s scheme is 
therefore the initiator to the ideas considered in this article because it has a means of generating keys 
and also the ability to secure the channel [4]. In addition, the research was reconstructed as the 
apparent vulnerability aspect of the Blom’s scheme. This key exchange protocol makes use of a very 
trusted sensor ID pre-allocated in each sensor. The seed will then generate a matrix over a 
predetermined field.  
 
3.2.1 Pre-Distribution Technique: Base Station Effect 
Easy deployment of security key algorithm: The article implements the deployment of the generated k 
pairwise key from the Base station. When base station receives a unicast request, it generates key and 
sends it to the node. When node receives the key, it stops to unicast to the base station and start to 
unicast to its entire neighbours. The first thing that happens is that it will request a unicast seed. When 
the node receives a seed request: it unicast its seed to the sender. When sender receives the seed, it says 
something like "Sending message to node x.y using pairwise key k". When the node receives a 
message it says something like "Received message from x.y, using pairwise key k". This system is an 
efficient security key algorithm method for pre-distribution. 
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During implementation, it was discovered that the scheme will not be effective with the original idea 
due to the following reasons: We would have to store information for every single node. We would 
have to know the exact number nodes in the network. When adding a new node we would have to 
update information on every single node. Therefore instead of storing nth row of the K matrix we 
should store nth of the A = (DG)T matrix. That gives us (λ+1) columns on every single node. When 
two nodes want to communicate, they will first exchange their seeds NS  where S a primitive element 
of ( )GF q and n is the number of node in the network, therefore the K generated becomes: 
                                                           
          
( 1)
. , ,
1
( )n m n k k m
k
K A G
λ +
=
= ∑            (10) 
That gives us sufficient scalability so we can add new nodes without breaking down the running 
network. The base station keeps a counter of number of nodes in the network and when new node n 
wants to join the network, the base station increments the counter, generates a column of G for the 
node n 
                                ( 1, 2,..., 16)A A A                                   (11) 
Therefore, the base station keeps track only of the matrix seed ns where n is the number of currently 
connecting node and generates column 
c
G  for the node. The base station also sends the seed ns  and 
the :n th row of A to the node n. The node n is now ready for distribution. 
 
3.3 Key Distribution 
Key distribution is an aspect of key pre-distribution that involves distribution of keys onto nodes 
before they are deployed. The sensor nodes therefore build up the network with the help of their secret 
k-keys after deployment. During the key distribution phase, pairwise keys are generated, placed in 
sensor nodes and each nodes searches the area in its sensing range to find another node to 
communicate with. This section describes steps employed to actualise the enhanced security technique.  
 
3.3.1 Mesh Distribution 
We proposed and implemented an intelligent Mesh pre-allocation routine mechanism. The code 
implements pairwise key pre-allocation, routing, and when communication is initialized, first the 
sender sends it’s pairwise key seed to the receiver. The receiver responds with its pairwise key seed 
and then the sender sends the message. The seeds are used for initiating encryption using AES. The 
mesh module sends packets using multi-hop routing to a specified receiver in the network using the 
Rime communication stack. This second phase in ensuring the routing is shorter in transmission so as 
to reduce the energy consumption and also the risk of attack from an intruder. We did channel the 
security concern to the multi hop routing with each node maintaining a routing table to select the next 
hop. The attributes of the table are node_id, distance, residual_ energy, hop_support and rank. For each 
node_id there is a record in the table. Node_id is unique for every node. Distance represents the 
distance from the neighbour cluster-head containing node_id. Residual_energy indicates how much 
energy the neighbouring cluster-head has. A cluster-head may relay more than one neighbouring 
cluster-heads’ data. So hop_support acts like a counter that informs about how many cluster-heads are 
being served by this cluster-head. The rank contains an integer value that represents how far the 
neighbour node is from BS. At the outset of network setup, every node has to get its rank. The nodes 
use predefined transmission range represented as r to calculate their ranks. Nodes in a particular cluster 
communicate with their CH directly. Nodes periodically inform CH about their residual energy levels 
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so that node with highest residual energy could be selected as next CH. The strength of this energy 
proposal is that it should minimize hop count and thus minimize energy consumption as applicable to 
security protocol. It also makes the routine dynamic, thereby giving hope of a security protocol in 
mobile wireless sensor network nodes. Therefore, to allow communication within the wireless sensor 
network, we needed to implement a routing mechanism that would: a) Allow node to communicate 
with base station. b) Allow node to communicate with other nodes. c) Allow node to communicate 
even if they are not neighbours. d) Allow node to find the shortest path to the destination. e) Be easy to 
implement. f) Be energy efficient 
We decided to use our modified mesh routine mechanism from Contiki OS standard library, because 
it provided all the features stated above. 
 
The smart mesh routine mechanism sends packets using multi-hop routine to a specified receiver 
somewhere in the network and uses three channels, one for multi-hop forwarding and two for the route 
discovery. As part of route discovery, it floods the entire network with route discovery request packets 
until the packet reaches its destination. When the packet reaches its destination, the destination node 
floods the network with route discovery response packet until it reaches the original route discovery 
request packet sender then knows that the shortest path to the receiver goes through the neighbour it 
received the response from first. It then chooses the neighbour as the next hop and using the multi-hop 
routing sends the data to the receiver. 
 
In this scheme as shown in Figure 1, node with ID 1 wants to communicate with mode with ID 6, so it 
floods the network with route discovery request packet and receives multiple responses, but chooses 
the first and therefore the fastest one. 
 
Figure 1.  Enhanced Routine Scheme 
 
3.4 Sensor Node Placement and Localization: Scalability Effect 
This article proposes and implements a mechanism whereby new nodes can be added without breaking 
down the network, giving sufficient scalability. The method involves sending a request to the Base 
station. When base station receives a unicast request, it generates key and sends it to the node. When 
node receives the key, it stops to unicast to the base station and start to unicast to all its neighbours. 
That gives us sufficient scalability so we can add new nodes without breaking down the running 
network. The base station keeps a counter of number of nodes in the network and when new node n 
wants to join the network, the base station increments the counter, generates a column of G for the 
node n. The base station also helps with the scalability by only keeping track of the matrix seed Sn 
where n is the number of currently connecting node and generates column 
c
G  for the node. The base 
station then sends the seed ns and the :n th row of A to the node n.  
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4 Results and Discussion 
This section detailed the experimentation of the proposed implementation for enhanced security 
technique for Wireless Sensor Network nodes in Rime and IP scenario. The Enhanced pre-distribution 
scheme allows any of the sensors in WSN to communicate to one another using uIP common pairwise 
key as long as the network contains more than λ- sensors, the network is then considered to be 
perfectly secured. Our scheme also solves the issues arising from the node congestion due to data 
distribution of keys with a more smart method for securing the data in the network called the 
Alternatives. This method involves the integration of uIP stack to the key management that allows the 
network to have extra security in the transmission and reception of data. 
 
4.1 Network Implementation Essentials 
We implemented Enhanced pairwise key pre-distribution scheme on two networking protocols, uIP 
and Rime to compare performance, energy efficiency and efficiency in general of the two methods. 
 
Contiki’s Rime networking stacks provides an energetically inexpensive way of distributing small 
amounts of data amongst a sensor neighbours. It comes with various functions to send data using 
unicast or multicast by singlehop or multihop. It does not provide any functionality to communicate on 
Internet Protocol network. 
 
The uIP is an open source TCP/IP stack capable of being used with tiny 8-bit and 16-bit 
microcontrollers [25]. It implements RFC-complaint IPv4, IPv6, TCP and UDP (the latter two 
compatible with IPv4 and IPv6). uIP is very optimized, only the required features are implemented. 
For Instance there is a single buffer for the whole stack, used for received packets as well as for those 
packets to send. Moreover, Contiki's uIP networking stack comes with initialisation of various modules 
required for correct communication in wireless sensor network such as uIP-fw (uIP forwarding) and 
uip-over-mesh modules. 
We have therefore, used the Enhanced pairwise key pre-distribution scheme module running under 
Rime’s mesh but adds ability to communicate on Internet Protocol network. It is expected to have the 
same or even increased power consumption and decreased performance over the example using Rime 
protocol. Below, we provide comparison of the two methods in terms of energy efficiency and 
performance. 
 
4.2 Test Methodology 
We tested our two applications using Cooja that comes preinstalled on the Instant Contiki distribution. 
It provides various tools to debug ContikiOS applications without having physical sensors by 
emulating them. Firstly we have chosen strategic position of one base station and three nodes. The 
programs were designed to communicate to the node of ID 3, so we placed node 3 next to the base 
station, node with ID 2 on a place so it can reach node with ID 3 to test single-hop communication and 
the last node with ID 4 so it can reach node with ID 2 but cannot reach node with ID 3 to test the 
multi-hop communication. Table 2 shows the positions of nodes 1, 2, 3, 4 
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Table 2. Sensor node positioning 
Sensor ID X Y Z 
1 
2 
3 
4 
104.8 
66.33 
83.55 
34.25 
53.3 
66.37 
31.93 
82.17 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
Also, the following screenshots as shown in Figure 2 illustrates the visibility of each node in the 
wireless sensor network.  
 
Figure 2. Node Placement Simulations 
4.3 Performance 
The table below shows speeds of single-hop and multi-hop communication for key pre-distribution and 
communication phase for both uIP and Rime protocols. 
 
Table 3. Key Pre-distribution and Communication Phase 
Network 
Stack 
Single-hop 
Communication 
Multi-hop 
Pre-
Allocation 
 
Communicatio
n 
Pre-Allocation Communicatio
n 
Rime 
uIP 
46ms 
91ms 
7ms 
7ms 
*NA 
*A 
1845ms 
15ms 
 
* Pre-allocation in Rime's example is made using unicast that correctly does not allow pre-allocation 
on multi-hop connections. Because uIP communication uses Rime's mesh connection by default, it 
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automatically allows pre-allocation phase on multi-hop and further steps are needed to forbid this 
behaviour. 
 
4.4 Power Consumption 
We have measured power consumption using energest in our code by capturing energest values before 
and after the transmission and computing the actual consumption. Energest is use for obtaining per-
component power consumption in Contiki. Thus, using the formula below if we do not divide by 
runtime, calculates the energy consumption during runtime. 
( ) ( )Power pW   txend  txstart  *  20mA *  3V /  32768= −  
The 20mA are pre-measured (or from data sheet), 3V is the operational voltage (approximated) and 
32768 is ticks per second (as of Contiki 2.5). By measuring and computation of the final values we got 
following power consumption as shown in Figure 3 but the value of the Multi-hop Communication 
(sender) of the Rime stack had to be multiplied by 0.1 because the original value distorts other values 
displayed in the graph. 
 
Figure 3.  Power Consumption Analysis of uIP and Rime using Enhanced scheme 
5 Conclusions  
The fear of possible interference, corrupting a message transmitted by sensor nodes to and from the 
Base station was highly considered in the novelty of this article. Treating issues like denial-of –service 
(DOS) and algorithmic complexity attacks is not an easy task and it can detour the effective usage or 
benefit of WSN to the field of healthcare, Oil and Gas and military formations. This article has 
presented the smart security technique for wireless sensor network nodes with key management system 
as the direct approach to sensor nodes communication and security. It highlights a coordinated and 
careful usage of advanced encryption standard (AES), generation of the key parameters that makes the 
sensors communicate more freely, confidentially and with integrity. The technique also makes a very 
strong case in making sure that scalability was achieved during implementation. 
 
The uIP and Rime resources have exposed what was expected with our model. As we’ve shown from 
the figures, there are a quite number of solutions that makes the Enhanced Key management scheme 
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suitable for uIP-WSN communication. The actual implementation of the modification of uIP open 
source stack to accommodate the sensor nodes code using the key distribution method as an interface 
with sensor nodes within an IP domain therefore provides communication faster than the traditional 
Rime communication but with decreased performance without creating problems of overhead, and 
memory capacity. Although the power consumption tends to be higher than the Rime, but it all 
depends on trade-off of different performance control and what the designer is prone to secure.  
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